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COMMENTS
THE NATIONAL GUARD
AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT*
STANLEY D. ROSEi

In a comment appearing in a previous issue of the Vanderbilt Law
Revie'w there was a discussion of the application to military personnel
of the Federal Tort Claims Act.1 One part of that comment may now
be expanded. The torts of National Guardsmen whose units have not
been called into federal service do not create a cause of action under
2
the Federal Tort Claims Act.
The National Guard of the United States is a reserve component of
the Army of the United States.3 It is made up of the National Guard
of the several states, territories and the District of Columbia. The
statute governing the Guard, however, is explicit that:
"Except when ordered thereto in accordance with law, members of the
National Guard of the United States... shall not be on active duty in the
service of the United States. When not on active duty in the service of
the United States, they shall be administered, armed, uniformed, equipped,
and trained in their status as the National Guard ...of the several States,
Territories, and the District of Columbia ....-4

This provision is taken to make it clear that the National Guard
remains a state institution until called into federal service.5 The Guard
may be ordered into active federal service by the President and continued in such service as long as is necessary, whenever Congress
determines that troops are needed for the national security in excess
of those in the Regular Army. At the time of such order, the members
* The views expressed in this comment are personal to the writer and do
not necessarily represent the position of any Government agency with which
he is, or has been, associated.
t Attorney, Department of Justice, Claims Division.
1. Comment, McNiece and Thornton, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Its
Application to Military Personnel, 5 VA-D.L. REV. 57 (1951).
2. McCranie v. United States, 199 F.2d 581

(5th Cir. 1952); Dover v.

United States, 192 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1951); Williams v. United States, 189
F.2d 607 (loth Cir. 1951); Satcher v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 919 (W.D.S.C.
1952); Glasgow v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ala. 1951); Mackay v.
United States, 88 F. Supp. 696 (D. Conn. 1949).
3. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 701 et seq. (July 9, 1952). This Act supersedes the pertinent provisions in
Title 32 of the Code.
4..Id. at § 709.
5. For the statutory history of the National Guard and its predecessors see:
Colby and Glass, The Legal Status of the National Guard, 29 VA. L. REv. 839
(1943); Colby, The Status of the National Guard, 98 CENT. L.J. 240 (1925);

Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54

HARV.

L. Ray. 181 (1940).

COMMENTS
of the units shall "stand relieved from duty in the National Guard
of their respective states .... -6

In addition to the clear statutory intent, there were also a number
of judicial holdings, federal 7 and state,8 prior to 1946, that the
Guard was a state institution. Nevertheless, following the passage in
1946 of the Federal Tort Claims Act, numerous suits were fied based
upon the legal conclusion that National Guardsmen were federal employees under the Act. 9 The courts have uniformly rejected this contention.
In Glasgow v. United States, 0 a Tennessee National Guardsman was
involved in an accident while en route to summer maneuvers which
had been ordered by the Secretary of the Army. He was driving an
Army vehicle loaned for use on these maneuvers. Summary judgment
for the Government was granted on the ground that the Guardsman
was not a federal employee. This result was unaffected by the fact
that Guardsmen receive the same benefits as the Regular Army 1 and,
6. Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 476, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 710 (July 9, 1952). "The National Guard is only a potential part of the
United States Army, and does not in fact become a part thereof until Congress
has made the requisite declaration of the existence of an emergency .... [T]he

Governor is commander in chief of the National Guard until Congress declares
an emergency to exist and the guard becomes an actual part of the National
Army, when the President becomes commander in chief." Bianco v. Austin,
204 App. Div. 34, 197 N.Y. Supp. 328, 330, 331 (1st Dep't 1922). See also Gibson
v. State, 173 Misc. 893, 19 N.Y.S.2d 405 (Ct. Cl. 1940), affd, 21 N.Y.S.2d 362
(3d Dep't); Baker v. State, 200 N.C. 232, 156 S.E. 917 (1931); State v. Johnson,
186 Wis. 1, 202 N.W. 191 (1925). The state character of the Guard in another
phase was emphasized in the testimony of Maj. Gen. Milton A. Reckord, the
Adjutant General of the Maryland National Guard, in opposing the Armed
Forces Reserve Act of 1952, an effort to reorganize the reserve elements of the
Armed Forces. He said that the Guard opposed the bill for several reasons,
one of which was that "The bill as written is one more attempt to federalize
the National Guard." Hearingsbefore a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services on H. R. 5426, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 114 (1952). The Senate
Subcommittee denied having any such intent to alter the traditional place of
the National Guard in our defense structure. SEN. REP. No. 1795, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1952).
7. In United States ex rel. Gillett v. Dern, 74 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1934), it
was held that Congress had authority to determine the extent of the aid, support
and assistance which shall be given the National Guard of the various states
and the terms upon which it shall be granted without affecting the state
character of the Guard.
8. It has been held that a Guardsman injured or killed in the line of duty,
e.g., on summer maneuvers, is entitled to recover from the state either under
the workmen's compensation statute or by filing a claim in the state court of
claims. Spence v. State, 159 Misc. 797, 288 N.Y. Supp. 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1936); Dicicco
v. State, 152 Misc. 541, 273 N.Y. Supp. 937 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Baker v. State, 200
N.C. 232, 156 S.E. 917 (1931); State v. Johnson, 186 Wis. 1, 202 N.W. 191 (1925).
See Hays v. Illinois Terminal Transportation Co., 363 Ill. 397, 2 N.E.2d 309, 311
(1936). But see Andrews v. State, 53 Ariz. 475, 90 P.2d 995 (1939); Goldstein
v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939).
9. For purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act, an employee of the Government "includes . . . members of the military or naval forces of the United
States.... ." 62 STAT. 982 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 106 (1949), 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2671 (1950).
10. 95 F. Supp. 213 (N.D. Ala. 1951).
11. All members of the Armed Forces, including National Guardsmen called
to duty for 14 days or more shall be automatically insured by the United
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12
further, that the Federal Government pays and equips the units. It
was not enough to confer jurisdiction that either the truck or the
driver had been lent by the Army to the Guard. 13 The lack of significance of federal assistance was explained in the Glasgow case:
"Not every person who accepts or is eligible to receive its bounty
is an employee of the Government. In an era of subsidies and14grants
in aid, such a conclusion would be a complete non sequitur.'
Having determined that the National Guard remains a state organization regardless of benefits and assistance received from the Federal
Government, it should be surprising to find the courts now having
difficulty with the status of National Guard unit caretakers. The
statute provides that funds appropriated for use of the National Guard
may be used to hire caretakers. A caretaker may be an enlisted man
of the National Guard or he may be a civilian. If he is such an enlisted man, his pay as caretaker shall be in addition to that which he
is paid as a guardsman.15 This provision, when read in context, appears
to be one more section prescribing regulations to govern the operation
of the National Guard. When taken as a whole, the laws of Congress
have been held not to affect the state character of the Guard, and yet,
the unit caretaker has been held to be an employee of the United
States. 16 This finding is not easily arrived at since the caretaker is
usually an enlisted Guardsman who has the additional duties of
unit caretaker. In the Holly case, the criteria for determining Government liability was stated to be whether the tortfeasor was acting as
a member of the National Guard or "as a caretaker of United States
7
property as contemplated by the foregoing statutes."'

States without cost against death in the amount of $10,000. 65 STAT. 33 (1951),

38 U.S.C.A. § 851 (Supp. 1951). National Guardsmen if injured or killed while

on active duty for any period shall be entitled to the same pensions, compensation awards, pay, allowances, and other benefits as are granted to Regular
Army personnel of corresponding rank or grade. 63 STAT. 202 (1949), 32
U.S.C.A. § 160a (Supp. 1951).
12. For the fiscal year ending in June, 1953, Congress has appropriated
$153,300,000 for the Army National Guard and $106,000,000 for the Air National
Guard. Pub. L. No. 488, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, V (July 10, 1952).
13. Mackay v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 696 (D. Conn. 1949).
14. Glasgow v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 213, 214 (N.D. Ala. 1951). "The
mere fact that the United States government supplied the money and the
equipment to carry on the training program did not take the enlisted guardsmen out of the control of the officers of the National Guard or make them any
less agents of the state of New York." Dicicco v. State, 152 Misc. 541, 273
N.Y. Supp. 937, 939 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
15. 61 STAT. 501 (1947), 32 U.S.C.A. § 42 (Supp. 1951). The Army Regulations governing these caretakers are rather elaborate except that specific
details are in most instances left to the state adjutant generals. The regulations
are printed in United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1951).
16. Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v.
Duncan, 197 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221
(10th Cir. 1951). Contra: Williams v. United States, 189 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
1951); Nietupski v. United States, Civ. No. 2095 (W.D. Wis.) (motion to
dismiss granted on May 8, 1950).
17. United States v. Holly, 192 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1951).
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This seems to be a clean distinction and its application should not
be too difficult. It narrows this type of case down to the single issue
of exactly on whose business was the caretaker when he committed
the tort. This distinction makes understandable the five cases that
have covered the point thus far. In the Williams case, the caretaker,
a sergeant in the Guard, told X, a minor, to wash a truck and prepare
it for a National Guard inspection. X drove the truck negligently in
the performance of this mission and killed plaintiff's decedent.' 8 In
the Holly case, which was decided against the Government, the caretaker was "carrying supplies, among other things anti-freeze solution,
to be used by him in the performance of his duties as a caretaker of
United States property." The caretaker hit the Holly car while on
this mission. 19 The case was apparently decided on the ground that
the caretaker was taking care of United States property at the time
of the accident. In the Duncan case, the caretaker "was ordered by
the Governor, acting through the Adjutant General of Texas, to
make a trip to Camp Mabry, at Austin, Texas, for the purpose of
receiving a vehicle for the Terrill unit. '20 The district court made the
express finding that this act was performed by the soldier in his
capacity of unit caretaker. The court of appeals specifically confirmed
this finding. 21 The finding was not so inherently unreasonable or arbitrary as to merit a prolonged fight for reversal. Finally, in the Elmo
case, we simply find that before trial in the district court, there was a
stipulation that at the time of the accident, the soldier was acting
within the scope of his employment as unit caretaker. The court of
appeals pointed to this stipulation twice and never once mentioned that
there was an agreed summary of testimony which demonstrated that
at the time of the accident the soldier was on a regular trip as mail
orderly for his National Guard unit.22 The stipulation thus triumphed.
These experiences should alert counsel in these cases, and, in the
future, the fight over these findings will probably be decisive.
This tolerance of the Holly criterion is not to be taken as agreement
as to its validity. The distinction there made was not at all necessary.
In every case likely to arise it will be found that the caretaker, be he
civilian or National Guardsman, is working under the direct supervision and control of a National Guard officer. Under such circumstances, the tortfeasor may be regarded as either an employee of the
18. Complaint, Williams v. United States, Civ. No. 2700 (E.D. Okla.)
19. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Holly v. United States, Civ. No.
2436 (N.D. Okla., Dec. 6, 1950). In the Nietupski case, decided for the Government, the caretaker was also on a mission of picking up supplies for his Guard
unit. The Nietupski complaint alleged "in the course of his employment as a
civilian employee of the United States National Guard. ..."
20. Duncan v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Tex. 1951).
21. United States v. Duncan, 197 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1952).

22. Government's Brief, p. 47, Elmo v. United States, 197 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
1952).
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Guard or a federal employee lent23 to the Guard who in both cases
will be performing Guard business and in neither case should the torts
of such a person render the Federal Government liable. 24
23. See Fries v. United States, 170 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 1948) for discussion
of the lent servant doctrine. The controlling case is Denton v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R., 284 U.S. 305, 52 Sup. Ct. 141, 76 L. Ed. 310 (1932), which
distinguishes Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29 Sup. Ct. 252, 53
L. Ed. 480 (1909). See also Cobb v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. La. 1948).
The RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 227 (1933) indicates that the rule is not selfoperating but in comment a it declares that "the important question is
whether or not, as to the act in question, he is acting in the business of and
under the direction of one or the other [masters]."
24. Since 1946 in all acts appropriating funds for the Department of the Army
there have been funds provided for the payment by the Secretary of Defense of
certain claims founded upon torts of National Guardsmen. In Title II of the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1953, funds are appropriated for
the payment of "claims (not to exceed $1,000 in any one case) for damages
to or loss of private property incident to the operation of Army and Air
National Guard camps of instruction, either during the stay of units of said
organizations at such camps or while en route thereto or therefrom." Pub.
L. No. 488, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. tit. II, V (July 10, 1952).

